STUN attribute parsing using `stun_attr_get_next_str` or `stun_attr_get_next` processes trailing attributes past MESSAGE-INTEGRITY, allowing an on-path attacker to inject unauthenticated STUN attributes. Use `stun_attr_get_next_covered_str` or `stun_attr_get_next_covered` instead.
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Raw response data is cached/returned instead of verified record text from tlog.ParseRecord, allowing unauthenticated checksum lines to be accepted.
Calling `start_tls` without first clearing the protocol's internal receive buffer allows unencrypted data injected by a network attacker prior to the TLS handshake to persist and be processed as authentic data within the encrypted TLS session (STARTTLS injection). Ensure any buffered plaintext bytes are purged (e.g., `del self._buffer[:]` or `self._buffer.cl
The application blindly trusts the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header to dictate the URL scheme without verifying whether the originating proxy is trusted. This allows an attacker to spoof the protocol (e.g., impersonating an HTTPS request over HTTP) and potentially bypass scheme-based access control rules. Ensure that `X-Forwarded-*` headers are only used when they